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Abstract With poverty reduction being one of the five targets
of the EU 2020 process, poverty is currently high on the
agenda for the European Union and the 27 Member States.
The applied methodology of measuring poverty and social
exclusion (EU-SILC) calls for critical reflection, because it
systematically overlooks absolute or extreme forms of pover-
ty. Thus, the most vulnerable remain invisible. This fact poses
a major challenge for future planning and the future of social
policies. This article proposes an understanding of poverty as
restricted access to relevant futures: a deprivation of access to
possibilities and chances. Following this, we argue that “in-
visible” persons living in conditions of severe poverty are
forced into horizons of damaged futures. Furthermore, a fail-
ure to “see” these forms of poverty has an impact on the
already limited future prospects of these groups on yet another
level. The most vulnerable, such as homeless children, undoc-
umented refugees and asylum seekers, migrant beggars and
other homeless people, are excluded from both analysis and
social policies. This can be regarded as a second-order meth-
odological neglect of relevant futures. Overcoming such
second-order neglect is a necessary and first step towards
establishing choices about relevant futures for these persons.
There is a moral as well as an epistemic responsibility vis-à-vis
those “invisible” groups. This is the basis for alleviating
conditions of access to relevant futures. The article concludes
with a plea for a “visibilization” of non-targeted and unper-
ceived poor persons living in extreme poverty in Europe.
Keywords Absolute poverty . Relative poverty . Social
exclusion . Capabilities . EU-SILC . EU 2020 targets
There are some who are in darkness
And the others are in light
And you see the ones in brightness
Those in darkness drop from sight
Bertolt Brecht, The Threepenny Opera
Introduction
In recent years, poverty has been high on the agenda of the
European Union and the 27 Member States. They have en-
gaged in considerable activities to tackle poverty and social
exclusion in Europe. The Member States agreed upon a broad
range of sophisticated methodologies to measure poverty and
exclusion. At the heart of these methodologies is the EU-SILC
approach, which provides the most relevant and “visible” data
on income and living conditions across Europe including
those of millions of households in (income) poverty. A sign
of the prominent place of the poverty agenda is the fact that the
year 2010 was declared the “European Year Against Poverty
and Social Exclusion”, a year dedicated to programmes and
events aiming to raise academic, political and public aware-
ness regarding poverty and to combat social exclusion more
forcefully. Furthermore, one of the five high-profile headline
goals of the EU 2020 process was dedicated to the contain-
ment of poverty and social exclusion, including explicit quan-
titative targets. It goes without saying that these efforts and
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intentions are commendable, and in the interest of future
social cohesion in Europe.
Some important details of this programmatic process, how-
ever, call for critical reflection. The aforementioned method-
ology, for example, raises serious concerns regarding its va-
lidity in the scholarly literature. In line with such criticisms,
this article is concerned with the fate of people suffering from
poverty that remains largely unmonitored. Absolute, severe or
extreme forms of poverty in the middle of Europe are system-
atically overlooked, and mostly uncaptured by the “poverty
radars”measuring poverty in Europe. This is not a minor flaw
in political perception created by statistical means, but a major
challenge for future planning and the future of social policies.
Our main argument takes as its point of departure an
understanding of poverty as restricted access to relevant fu-
tures: a deprivation of access to possibilities and chances
necessary for the cultivation and realization of human poten-
tial. Following this, we argue that “invisible” persons living in
conditions of severe poverty are forced into horizons of dam-
aged futures, which will also be the basis for the damaged
lives of their children. A failure to “see” these forms of
poverty has an impact on the already limited future prospects
of these groups on yet another level: processes of social
exclusion on the first level of the experience of social exclu-
sion are reiterated on a second level of analysis. In other
words: the most vulnerable are excluded from analysis and
social policies. This can be regarded as a second-order meth-
odological neglect of relevant futures.
In the first section, we elaborate the argument that poverty
can be understood in terms of neglected futures. According to
a widely shared concept initially proposed by Amartya Sen,
poverty can be conceptualized as a deprivation of capabilities.
The term “deprivation” indicates a culpable omission, or even
an explicit act robbing someone of the possibility of being
someone or doing something. There is a moment of “agency”
involved in this analysis. Deprivations of capabilities lead to a
limitation of “freedoms to choose”, and hence to limitations
on the freedoms to plan a life or to build a life in a step-by-step
manner. Poor people cannot develop what John Rawls called a
“life plan”, an architecture of goals and strategies to reach
those goals in order to realize their potential. Poverty kills
futures. In her well known diary of her life in a favela in São
Paulo in the 1950s, Carolina Maria de Jesus talks about the
loss of peace of mind resulting from the uncontrollable risks
and uncertainties about the future. This is a burden with regard
to the “big future” as well as for the “little future” of the day
ahead: “In the morning I’m always nervous. I’m afraid of not
getting money to buy food to eat” [1]. Poverty kills futures (of
adults) and “future futures” (of children). We can read in the
diary that there is no future for a child living in severe poverty
in a favela: “A child died here in the favela. He was 2 months
old. If he had lived he would have gone hungry” [1]. Carolina
Maria de Jesus was lucky in the sense that her diary was
published and she could move out of the favela. But again,
her future was damaged. Robert Levine observed: “By the
time she was liberated from the favela by a stroke of fate, it
was too late. She was exhausted, too beaten down to learn
middle-class manners, to censor her thoughts, to remove the
layers of suffering from her psyche” [2]. For a person living in
conditions of poverty, a number of relevant future scenarios
have been rendered impossible. “Relevant” futures are per-
sonally desirable scenarios that can be justified on the grounds
of human rights. Poverty limits both conceptions of and access
to relevant futures.
In the second section, we develop the idea that under
certain circumstances people are confronted with a second-
order neglect. This is the case whenwell-established academic
and political ways of dealing with poverty and poverty alle-
viation exclude affected groups from their approaches. This
epistemic negligence can be described as a drama of neglected
futures of a second order. Second-order neglects, we hold,
reiterate first-order neglects; they fail to conceptualize first-
order deprivations. The most serious instance of a second-
order neglect of relevant futures is the ignorance of invisible
groups. We argue that this is the case in the academic and
political discourse with regard to extreme forms of poverty in
Europe.
In section three, we demonstrate that such neglect can be
identified for the European Union and its Member States. It
can be shown that the methodology applied in the EU-SILC
panel statistics excludes certain groups of people in absolute
poverty, thus denying them proper recognition. This has, of
course, implications for action plans against poverty on the
first level of poverty alleviation efforts. Overcoming the
second-order neglect of relevant futures of these groups is a
necessary and first step towards establishing choices about
relevant futures for these persons. There is a moral as well as
an epistemic responsibility vis-à-vis those “invisible” groups
(section 4). This is the basis for alleviated conditions of access
to relevant futures. The article concludes with a plea for a
“visibilization” of non-targeted and unperceived poor persons
living in extreme poverty in Europe.
Poverty as a deprivation of relevant futures
According to a widely established concept, poverty can be
understood as a deprivation of capabilities [3]. Capabilities are
real freedoms of being and doing; poverty deprives the person
of understanding and realizing her potential, from grasping
potentials and possibilities. The idea behind this approach is
an Aristotelian understanding of the human person, and can be
reconstructed in the following terms: the human person lives
within a horizon of possible transformations of the current
situation. There are potentials within the person (“potentiae”)
and “possibilities in the world” (“possibilitates”). These two
types of the non-actual have to correspond (X has the potential
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to learn about basic health care, and there is the possibility to
act on that learning in a basic health unit). Aristotle, who was
interested in conceptualizing motion in the empirical world,
describes change in terms of that dynamics of transforming
possibilities into actual states of affairs. Change is always
about a situation A that is transformed into a situation B. A
process of change transforms a current situation A into a
future situation B. In this reading, change involves three types
of aspects: a) aspects that begin to exist (and are “future
aspects” given the current situation A), b) aspects that cease
to exist (and are “future non-aspects” given the current situa-
tion A), and c) aspects that are constants throughout the
process (thus connecting the current situation Awith the future
situation B). The present situation can be analysed against the
background of a horizon of possibilities, of future develop-
ments of this situation.
The transformation from potential to real happens accord-
ing to an Aristotelian analysis via movement [4].Motion is the
fulfilment of what exists potentially, insofar as it exists poten-
tially [5]. So, there is a potential for future development put in
place. Change (motion) is a fulfilment of a particular potenti-
ality. Motion is brought about by a particular already-existing
force, by something that has the power of causing motion. “A
thing is capable of causing motion because it can do this, it is a
mover because it actually does it” [5]. In other words, motion
presupposes something that already exists – things that are
capable of that motion [6] and resources that realize the
potential. “Incapacity is deprivation of a capacity” [7]. There
are two types of incapacity: lack of a particular disposition by
its nature (for example: a refrigerator cannot see) and lack of a
natural disposition (a blind person cannot see).
This is precisely the point where an understanding of
poverty as deprivation of capabilities comes in: a person is
deprived of a capability in the sense that the person could own
this capability, since the lack of the capability is not the lack of
a particular disposition by nature. The term “deprivation”
indicates a culpable omission, or even an act robbing someone
of the possibility of being someone or doing something. A
human person is an entity capable of many motions, e.g., the
motion of appropriating literacy and realizing the potential to
read and write. The motion to bring about literacy is based on
something real, it requires existing resources. These resources
(teacher, school, teaching material) need to be in place, as well
as the readiness on the side of the person to appropriate the
new capability (being able to read and write). This readiness is
a matter of having an understanding of oneself as a being
capable of obtaining a new skill. A person with low self-
esteem, a person who has been told that she is incapable of
learning anything, will not have the disposition to appropriate
certain capabilities. In this sense, too, poverty is a deprivation
of capabilities: poverty deprives persons of possibilities (re-
sources, structures) to realize a particular potential; it deprives
poor people of the understanding of their own potential; and,
very often, i t deprives poor people (because of
malnourishment, for instance) of potential.
A deprivation of capabilities leads to a limitation of “free-
doms to choose” [8]. The horizon of possible future situations
is restricted just as much as the set of possibilities to shape the
world on the basis of choices. Again, in an Aristotelian read-
ing so fundamental for the capabilities approach towards
poverty, human beings are in a privileged position to shape
the world by initiating actions – the origin of action in its
efficient cause is choice [9]. Human beings are capable of
making choices, based on desires and reasoning. It is precisely
this freedom to choose that is limited for people living in
poverty. If options and chances are confronted with obstacles
and agency is limited, the future is directly put into question; if
the development and cultivation of capabilities is restricted,
the future is impaired.
Thus, poverty can be understood in terms of disabled or
neglected futures. For a person in poverty, a number of
relevant future scenarios have been rendered impossible, a
set of relevant choices has to be neglected. A poor person can
be deprived of a future life as a well-nourished, literate,
decently employed person. Poverty limits both conceptions
of and access to relevant futures. Relevant futures are human-
rights-based conceptions of human transformation. To recog-
nize different forms of poverty, such as absolute poverty,
relative poverty or social exclusion, as a limitation to and a
neglect of the future is vital for academic and political ap-
proaches to poverty.
However, what if established academic and political ways
of dealing with poverty and poverty alleviation exclude cer-
tain affected groups from their approaches? What if these
approaches do not help to make people affected by poverty
seen? Such a constellation has to be understood as neglected
futures of a second order. In other words, second-order ne-
glects reiterate first-order neglects, i.e., they fail to conceptu-
alize first-order neglects. This is a social pathology according
to Axel Honneth. A social pathology deprives people of the
possibility to have a good life and of the possibility to con-
ceptualize this deprivation. Social pathologies operate, ac-
cording to Christoph Zurn’s reconstruction of Honneth’s ap-
proach, “by means of second-order disorders, that is, by
means of constitutive disconnects between first-order contents
and second-order reflexive comprehension of those contents,
where those disconnects are pervasive and socially caused”
[10].1 Social pathologies manifest an incongruity between
levels of experience and levels of reflexivity.
The most serious instance of a second-order neglect of
relevant futures is the ignorance of invisible groups. This is
happening in the academic and political discourse with regard
1 A. Honneth in his rejoinder in the same volume accepts this analysis as
exceptionally fruitful [11]. A more basic reconstruction of Honneth’s
concept of social pathologies is provided by Jean-Philippe Deranty [12].
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to extreme forms of poverty in Europe. It can be demonstrated
– see section 3 – that such neglect can be identified for the
European Union and its Member States. The fact that it is
precisely those affected by extreme poverty that are in this
way neglected calls for action on a first-order and on a second-
order level. Overcoming the second-order neglect of the rele-
vant futures of these groups is a necessary and first step
towards establishing choices about relevant futures for these
persons. In order to do that, poverty alleviation discourses
have to “see” these “invisible” groups and have to adapt their
analytical tools accordingly. Let us take a look at these two
steps separately.
A second-order neglect of relevant futures: invisible groups
The first step in remedying a second-order neglect of relevant
futures is the recognition of invisibility. William Vollman, in
his well-known account of forms of poverty worldwide, has
described “invisibility” as a key feature of poverty [13]. In
many instances, public spaces are denied to the poor (street
children, beggars, prostitutes, homeless people); they are
made invisible. This is a strategy of “spatial invisibility”.
The German journalist Günter Wallraff found out for himself
in an experiment what it was like to be homeless, live on the
streets and sometimes even be “locked up” in a storage con-
tainer (at times without windows) [14]. The “shelter” becomes
a strategy for spatial invisibility. Avishai Margalit, a philoso-
pher from Israel, has described a kind of “blindness” that
makes people treat others as if they were objects. He uses
the term “blindness to the human aspect” to characterize the
inability to see the humanness of a person [15]. Margalit
points out that this type of blindness means people look
through others or ignore them as though they were not there,
and is a key element of anti-colonial literature [15]. In Europe,
blindness to the human aspect is an experience recounted by
people struggling with poverty and low-income jobs. We give
two examples here. The French socio-anthropologist Anna
Sam describes how in working as cashier for several years in
a supermarket, she was looked at and treated more as an item
off the shelf than a living being [16]. Customers were obliv-
ious to the fact that a human individual was operating the till –
often ignoring her completely, without so much as a look or a
word. Florence Aubenas, who worked undercover as a low-
paid cleaner for 12 months to find out what it is like to try and
make a living, was told in an induction course that she should
not expect anyone to pass the time of day with her as a cleaner:
this was something she would have to get used to [17]. This is
“recognition invisibility”: people are present but are treated as
if they were objects. Axel Honneth has identified the experi-
ence of “seeing through or past” a person as a social pathology
[18]. It is a way of denying recognition. There are different
ways of ignoring a person, e.g., acting as if she were not
present; acting as if she were an object; or acting as if she
were not a full person. There is a link between invisibility due
to denied recognition and institutional practices that create
physical invisibility. The fact that industrialized countries
discuss a prohibition for public begging shows this link be-
tween an absence of public policies and the attempt to create
physical invisibility.2
This link between institutional practices and invisibility can
also happen on the level of institutional perception. What
happens if people affected by poverty are “overlooked” by
welfare policies? To put it differently: those people affected by
poverty are “visible” if they are institutionally defined and
recognized as “poor” – a phenomenon Georg Simmel identi-
fied a hundred years ago [21]. A reverse application of this
insight to those that are not in the same way “defined” as
affected by poverty, implies that they are ultimately and in this
sense “invisible” and are therefore not regarded as poor people
in need of aid. Institutional “visibility” is the result of basic
socio-political decisions. Only those that are considered by the
social statistical data are potential beneficiaries of targeted
measures of poverty policies. Admittedly, this does not apply
to most “universal” welfare services granted to all people on
record in the welfare system under consideration of their exact
welfare position. But there are “non-recorded” people in dire
need. They remain in the darkness, where they drop out of
sight.3
Heuristic invisibility, that is, the neglect of an official social
statistical existence, can be described as neglected futures of a
second order, as it affects the bases for decisions over govern-
mental measures for poverty reduction in relation to the af-
fected groups. There are many examples of such heuristic
neglect of a second order that do not originate in the field of
poverty research; often, however, certain overlaps are obvi-
ous: the descendants of African slaves in the United States
were not considered to be human beings in the sense that a
[white] citizen with full civil rights was. In the country where
the Declaration of Independence begins its preamble with the
famous passage “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that
all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these
are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness”, the long
struggle of African Americans demonstrates how more than
100 years of slavery and more than 200 years of an apartheid
regime could be defended and justified even before the Su-
preme Court. A similar relation can be identified in the cases
of “invisible” housekeepers and caretakers from regions like
Central and Eastern Europe or Mexico. These people provide
2 See, for example, a European debate analysed by Joe Doherty et al. [19]
and a discussion in Arizona, critically assessed by Julia Koestner [20].
3 To put it another way (that refers to the structure of a social pathology):
they remain in hell. Barbara Müller has pointed out that there is a rich
tradition in monastic wisdom talking about hell as a place of darkness
(”skotus”) – a darkness that precludes the possibility of seeing other
persons and seeing the glory of God [22].
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extraordinary services in many households ofWestern Europe
or North America, but all too often they become invisible in
different ways: they are not considered by social and employ-
ment laws or social statistics; even in biographies, they are
rarely mentioned.
Such neglected futures of a second order are reflected in the
political efforts of the European Union in the area of poverty
in the ways these efforts are defined among the EU 2020 goals
and, accordingly, in the established political process. There is
a dimension of institutional blindness that needs to be consid-
ered carefully. People living in extreme poverty, such as
homeless children in Eastern Europe, undocumented refugees
in Member States of the European Union, homeless people
and migrant beggars in European cities, are institutionally
invisible. They are not included in the future projections of
Europe 2020. Because of this flaw in the methodology and the
resulting perception, they are not targeted and thus deprived of
relevant futures. A first step to overcoming the first- and
second-order neglect of relevant futures is the “visibilization”
of non-targeted and unperceived poor living in extreme pov-
erty in Europe. This requires a change in the methodology too.
Neglected relevant futures in Europe: the case of absolute
poverty
The second step in fighting second-order neglect of relevant
futures, and thus in fighting the social pathology of
disconnecting the experience of people from the available
tools for analysis, is the reconsideration of the methodology.
The “invisibility” of certain groups can be linked to the
methodology for approaching poverty in a European context.
Since Peter Townsend’s ground-breaking research on rela-
tive poverty [23], there has been a latent assumption that
“absolute poverty” is a matter for developing countries and
the so-called “Third World”, whereas industrialized contexts
have less severe, less extreme forms of poverty, namely forms
of social exclusion considered as relative poverty. Coined by
the former president of theWorld Bank, Robert S.McNamara,
in 1973, “absolute poverty” means “a condition of life so
degraded by disease, illiteracy, malnutrition, and squalor as
to deny its victims basic human rights” [24]. What people
affected by such forms of (absolute) poverty lack can be
expressed on the basis of the inalienable human rights as
follows: absolute poverty is characterized by a lack of rights
to nutrition, clean drinking water and safe housing. Under-
stood in this way, absolute poverty indicates a lack of essential
basic goods. It is obvious that absolute poverty can be directly
translated as a form of neglected futures that must also be
considered absolute. Absolute poverty is discussed on a global
scale. If global poverty is to be reduced, the involved actors
think of absolute poverty. In the Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs), the United Nations, the World Bank and other
international organizations have set the goal of reducing the
number of people living under conditions of absolute or
extreme poverty by half from 1990 to 2015. In order to
measure such enormities, such life-threatening afflictions,
the following method was defined: people are considered to
be absolutely or extremely poor, if they have to live on less
than US $1.25 per day. This method of measuring absolute
poverty has drawn a lot of criticism [25]. While these forms of
poverty reduction through international programmes tend to
result in apparent victories, which seem to be backed up by the
collected data, the reality is that the poorest of the poor do
often not profit from the implemented measures at all; these
programmes, once again, do not improve the situation of those
affected by extreme poverty [26]. Possible reasons for this may
be costs, careers, or wrong measures taken [11]. This indicates
a situation of neglected futures on a higher level, a neglect of a
second order on a global scale – but outside Europe.
In accordance with their self-understanding as inclusive
welfare states, European countries have developed a more
sophisticated method for measuring poverty. The concept of
absolute poverty has been reshaped for the developed world,
accordingly. Depending on the respective officially recog-
nized method of measurement or social statistics, people in
Europe are hence considered to be affected by relative poverty
and/or social exclusion if they earn so little that (1) their
income is below the at-risk-of-poverty threshold, (2) if they
are long-term unemployed against their will, or (3) if they
have so little money at their disposal that they are unable to
cover the basic needs of the social living standard – e. g., four
or more out of nine basic needs according to the EU 2020
standard method (considerable material deprivation).4 The at-
risk-of-poverty threshold is set at 60 % of the median
equivalized disposable income; those earning less than 60 %
of this income average are considered to be at risk of poverty.
In 2012, this threshold was set at about €1090 per month in
Austria, at about €980 in Germany, at about €350 in Slovakia,
at about €143 in Bulgaria, and finally, at only about €105 in
Romania.5 The method that is used for the EU 2020 strategy
measures poverty and social exclusion by the indicators of
low income, low work intensity and/or material deprivation
4 Indicators for not covering these basic needs may be measured by (1)
the inability to pay off debts, (2) to cover unexpected costs of up to €650
per year, (3) to afford an annual holiday (1 week for each member of the
household), (4) to keep one’s accommodation warm, (5) to regularly
include meat, fish or comparable vegetarian food in their diet, or (6) to
afford a car, (7) a television set, (8) a washing machine, or (9) a (mobile)
phone.
5 It must be noted that the income of those whose income is below this
threshold is usually considerably below it. In Austria, the average income
of people at risk of poverty, measured by the so-called poverty gap, was
€219 below the amount set for the threshold in 2012; following these
statistics, this means that half of the people at risk of poverty had a regular
income of less than €870 per month. In addition to that, the calculations of
these means of measuring income poverty do not consider expenses to
pay off debts, for hospital stays, medication or remedies.
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according to these thresholds. All indicators are measured on a
household level.
As mentioned above, with its EU 2020 strategy, the Euro-
pean Union aims to reduce the number of people affected by
poverty and social exclusion in the entire EU area by 20
million people. Generally speaking, not all people affected
by poverty who are reached by the welfare state and poverty
policy benefit from the applied measures in a way that sub-
stantially improves their situation and opens up possibilities
and opportunities (poverty is a “wicked problem” that cannot
be “solved”). But many cases demonstrate that welfare sup-
port does help people at risk of poverty to stay above the
(monetary) at-risk-of-poverty threshold. This indication is
hard to ignore and points to the (insufficient, but still existing)
poverty-avoiding effect of the welfare state’s redistribution
policy.6 This also applies for the EU 2020 process.
The EU 2020 headline target of reducing poverty and
social exclusion has been confronted with substantial critique
from different sources. Maître, Noland and Whelan raise
general questions concerning the validity of the selected meth-
odology [32]. Frazer and Marlier identify similar problems.
Interestingly, they raise an argument within the concern of this
paper. The authors plead in favour of making the reduction of
child poverty a subordinate headline target, as this problem
has previously not been sufficiently considered [33]. Finally,
Nicaise and Schockaert explicitly approach the question of the
extent to which EU-SILC excludes groups of scarcely acces-
sible people affected by poverty; they examine in what ways
the items of EU-SILC inadequately document situations of
poverty, and furthermore they test an alternative methodology
that aims to overcome some of these identified problems.
Taking the example of Belgium, they point to the exclusion
of an estimated 10,000 travelling circus people and people
living on boats or ships (“bargees”), as well as an additional
10,000 Roma, besides other examples. None of these people
are considered by the measurements of the EU-SILC. Further-
more, an additional 14,300 people (according to outdated and
presumably inadequate estimates) live in unofficial accommo-
dation such as tent camps; for the year 2003, FEANTSA, the
European Federation of National Organizations Working with
the Homeless, estimated the number of homeless people at
17,000; the authors presume that this number has increased
considerably since then [34].
In all of those cases, the exclusion of people affected by
absolute poverty is rooted in the methodology. EU-SILC is
laid out as a panel survey addressing households; however,
many of those affected by extreme poverty do not have
permanent accommodation, or do but are unable to use it
permanently. Their number is considerable: several hundreds
of thousands of people spend night after night in the open, in
emergency shelters, at other people’s homes, or are placed in
homes or institutions. Nicaise and Schockaert estimate, for
Belgium, that the lack of representation of this group in the
EU-SILC’s data lowers the ratio of people at risk of poverty by
an extent that lies somewhere between 0.6 and 1.7% [34]. The
Belgian example impressively demonstrates that the EU-SILC
ignores and excludes some of those people who are most
affected by poverty. Such practices distort the assessment of
poverty numbers and question the reliability of the applied
methodology. The study shows that two independently sur-
veyed groups – homeless people and undocumented refugees
– need to be considered as groups most affected by poverty
and deprivation [34]. However, the study also shows that the
inclusion of these excluded groups requires special methodo-
logical attention and sensitivity, on the one hand. On the other,
it may reveal especially problematic areas that appear to be
relevant for future collections of data, but may also be helpful
for the reduction of poverty “on the ground” [34]. The meth-
odological reason for this non-representation cannot be sepa-
rated from political decisions over certain methodologies of
poverty reports. In this case, the invisibility of extremely poor
people is caused by methodologies; the responsibility, how-
ever, remains at the political and at the scholarly level.
The politics of ignoring or recognizing neglected futures
The fact that forms of absolute poverty are neglected in
Europe deepens the deprivation of relevant futures of the
people involved. Academic and social statistical poverty re-
search has a responsibility to be concerned with “relevant
futures”. This requires an understanding of neglected futures
on a meta-level. By understanding neglected futures, academ-
ic and political discourse can contribute, e.g., also in cooper-
ation with pressure groups, to resistance to restriction and a
fight for the freedoms to choose relevant futures – future lives
people have reasons to value. Some of the official reports on
poverty andwealth that emerged in Germany during the 1990s
serve as an illustrative example, as they are the result of the
joint efforts of welfare organizations, communities and devot-
ed academics [35]. These joint efforts are expressions of
“concerns about relevant futures”.
Poverty alleviation and poverty reduction conducted from
academic and political perspectives is therefore at the same
time an approach to open life options and to regaining the
future: this is as relevant as draining swamps or building dams
to the reclamation of land. The aims of these measures are
always directed at human beings who are destitute and whose
dignity is in danger. In this sense, poverty research and welfare
policies work on possibilities for the future on a new level, a
future of a second order. “First-order work on the future” is
committed to applying results of the analysis of the “second-
6 For a long-term perspective in late post-war Europe, compare Brady
[27]. For an analysis of poverty in employment, see Lohmann [28] and
Lohmann and Andreß [29]. For recent European data, see Caminada &
Goudswaard [30]; for differences between European welfare systems and
the US, see Caminada & Martin [31].
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order work on the future”. The relationship between first-order
futures and second-order futures can be linked to the relation-
ship between tangible and intangible infrastructures. Intangi-
ble infrastructures like knowledge and values shape the plan-
ning and structure of tangible infrastructures like dams and
bridges [36]. Neglecting the intangible infrastructure will
inevitably lead to a neglect of tangible structures. Similarly,
blind spots in poverty research and/or inactivity of welfare
politics need to be regarded as ways of neglecting second-
order futures. In some circumstances, such blind spots as lack
of analysis will lead to programmes that do not do justice to
the needs of the target groups – that is, if certain groups are
targeted at all.
Conclusion
The most serious instance of a second-order neglect of rele-
vant futures is the ignorance of invisible groups. We have
demonstrated such neglect for the anti-poverty policies of the
European Union and its Member States: the development and
consolidation of reporting on poverty during recent years has
favoured the development that the groups most severely af-
fected by poverty have become largely invisible within social
statistics. This trend, as well as the failure to provide assis-
tance through poverty policy, becomes evident in the poverty
policy programme of the EU 2020 strategy: the strategy’s goal
is to reduce the number of people affected by poverty and
social exclusion by 20 million by 2020, and the Member
States’ efforts are adjusted to this target. The strategy’s sub-
jects are those people whose situation has roughly been iden-
tified through a certain methodological approach as relatively
poor. However, the statistics do not consider people living
under conditions of extreme poverty (i.e., homeless people,
undocumented refugees, immigrants escaping from extreme
poverty in their home countries, etc.), and accordingly, their
destiny is irrelevant for reaching or not reaching the goal of the
EU 2020 strategy of a reduction of poverty and social exclu-
sion. The fact that it is precisely those affected by extreme
poverty that are in this way neglected poses a serious problem,
and calls for action on a first-order and on a second-order
level. Overcoming the second-order neglect of relevant fu-
tures of these groups is a necessary and first step towards
establishing choices about relevant futures for these persons.
In order to do that, poverty alleviation discourses have to
“see” these “invisible” groups and have to adapt their analyt-
ical tools accordingly. This insight into the potentially dramat-
ic consequences of heuristic invisibility of the most vulnerable
must be answered by a plea for a widely informed, plural and
egalitarian practice of poverty and futures research – a practice
that focuses especially on “suppressed” and “under-represent-
ed” phenomena from the margins of a society [37]. It also
demonstrates the common responsibility of the political and
the academic elites to recognize and “see” the most vulnerable
and to make them be seen in programmes and theories, in
practical tools and future scenarios.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License which permits any use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and the
source are credited.
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